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How Word-Of-Mouth Transmission Encouragement Affects Consumers’ Transmission 
Decisions, Receiver Selection, and Diffusion Speed 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research considers how marketers can encourage or “nudge” consumers to transmit 
word of mouth (WOM), such as referrals or recommendations to friends, in a manner that helps 
reach, inform, or influence large numbers of consumers quickly, which is an outcome referred to 
as faster diffusion. Building on studies showing diffusion is faster when higher-connectivity 
people are involved, the authors propose a mechanism based on network externalities that 
encourages regular customers to select receivers who have higher levels of social connectivity. 
Three experiments and a simulation demonstrate the mechanism’s efficacy by showing (i) how 
regular consumers can be encouraged to select higher-connectivity friends as WOM receivers, 
(ii) why this mechanism works, and (iii) how encouraging this receiver selection behavior can 
lead to faster diffusion at the macro level. The findings extend the WOM marketing literature by 
introducing an approach for encouraging transmissions to specific types of consumers that is a 
viable alternative to directly targeting higher-connectivity consumers in seeded WOM 
campaigns, which is often practically infeasible. 
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1. Introduction 
A common marketing objective is to have consumers transmit firm-related information, 
such as referrals and recommendations, to friends via word of mouth (WOM). The importance of 
WOM-based information sharing and referrals is well established in marketing (e.g., Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004, 2009; Libai et al. 2010; for reviews see Berger 2014, Lamberton and Stephen 
2016, Stephen 2016), and WOM is a key driver of customer value (Kumar, Petersen, and Leone 
2007; Kumar et al. 2010; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van den Bulte 2011). Getting people to spread 
awareness and information to friends via online and offline social networks in order to generate 
collective action is also important outside of marketing, where it is referred to as social 
mobilization (Pickard et al. 2011; Rutherford et al. 2013a, 2013b). A defining feature of social 
mobilization is faster information diffusion; i.e., information should reach as many people as 
possible in as little time as possible (Pickard et al. 2011).
1
 In WOM marketing, this implies that 
information spreads not only widely but also quickly. This is practically important in many 
situations, e.g., when racing against competition to attract new customers, when a promotion is 
available for a limited time, when managing a crisis (e.g., a recall), or when a new product has a 
short time to turn a profit (e.g., theatrical movie releases). 
How can a WOM-driven, social mobilization outcome, characterized by faster diffusion, 
be encouraged by marketers when seeding WOM campaigns? Extant literature has considered 
how to encourage widespread diffusion. However, the rate at which this occurs and, specifically, 
faster diffusion, has received scant attention. An exception is Goldenberg, Han, Lehmann, and 
Hong (2009) who consider acceleration of diffusion processes in the context of virtual goods in 
an online social network, although the their focus is on macro-level outcomes instead of the 
                                                 
1
 Diffusion speed can be considered in two ways. First, the amount of time taken for information to spread to a fixed 
number of people (i.e., less time to reach a fixed number of people = faster diffusion). Second, the number of people 
information spreads to in a fixed time period (i.e., more people in a fixed time = faster diffusion). 
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micro-level WOM transmission behaviors that affect such outcomes.
2
 Of the research that 
focuses on micro-level aspects of WOM transmission that make macro-level diffusion outcomes 
more likely, two main approaches have emerged. One focuses on transmitter characteristics, and 
suggests that individual characteristics might make some people better WOM transmitters than 
others; e.g., opinion leadership and or market mavenism (e.g., Feick and Price 1987; Iyengar, 
Van den Bulte, and Valente 2011), customer loyalty (Godes and Mayzlin 2009), or customer 
value (Haenlein and Libai 2013).
3
 The other focuses on network characteristics, and suggests 
that some people are better WOM transmitters because they have larger social networks or 
higher social connectivity (i.e., “high degree” people or “hubs”), affording higher potential reach 
when they transmit (e.g., Goldenberg et al. 2009; Hinz, Skiera, Barrot, and Becker 2011).
4
  
Both approaches emphasize transmitter-level characteristics that indicate a person is 
“special” and thus likely more effective as a WOM transmitter. Accordingly, research on seeded 
WOM marketing campaigns—where firms solicit specific consumers as transmitters—suggests 
that transmitter characteristics such as high connectivity are important when firms select seeds 
(e.g., Hinz et al. 2011). However, while it is logical to target consumers with special 
characteristics to be WOM transmitters, it is unfortunately often infeasible for marketers to 
identify, let alone recruit and activate, such individuals.  
We propose an alternative approach for seeding WOM marketing campaigns that focuses 
specifically on faster diffusion as the desired macro-level goal (as opposed to diffusion without 
explicit concern for time). Contrary to prior research suggesting the direct targeting of special 
                                                 
2
 It is common in to focus on micro-level behaviors when examining factors at the individual transmitter level (e.g., 
Berger 2011; Barasch and Berger 2014; Chen and Berger 2013; Frenzen and Nakamoto 1993; Ryu and Feick 2007). 
3
 Notwithstanding the literature on opinion leadership and influencers, Iyengar et al. (2011) raise doubts over the 
efficacy of opinion leaders as drivers of new product diffusion processes. 
4
 Although high-connectivity hubs are seen as important drivers of diffusion, Watts and Dodds (2007) question their 
role and suggest instead that collective action depends on the susceptibility to influence of receivers.  
 5 
consumers as transmitters, we advocate the use of regular consumers—people who do not have 
special traits such as opinion leadership or high levels of social connectivity. Instead of focusing 
seeding on special transmitter characteristics, we consider how marketers can encourage or 
“nudge” regular consumers to direct their WOM transmissions to receivers who possess 
characteristics that will likely help accelerate, and thus quickly propel diffusion. Our approach 
shifts the focus from transmitter selection (“Who is the transmitter?”) to receiver selection (“To 
whom is information transmitted?”), a topic which has been rarely addressed in research on firm-
initiated WOM marketing.
5
 In line with prior work showing that diffusion accelerates once 
higher-connectivity people are reached and that social mobilization requires the involvement of 
higher-connectivity people (Goldenberg et al. 2009; Rutherford et al. 2013a), we consider how to 
encourage regular consumers to transmit WOM to their higher-connectivity friends. 
This paper reports three experiments and a simulation showing (i) how regular consumers 
can be encouraged to select higher-connectivity friends as WOM receivers, (ii) why our 
mechanism, based on network externality, works, and (iii) that encouraging this receiver 
selection behavior can lead to faster diffusion at the macro level. Theoretically, we build on 
research on WOM referral incentives (e.g., Biyalogorsky, Gerstner, and Libai 2001; Ryu and 
Feick 2007; Schmitt et al. 2011; Verlegh, Ryu, Tuk, and Feick 2013) and social mobilization 
mechanisms (e.g., Pickard 2011; Rutherford 2013a, 2013b). Although incentives can be effective 
for increasing WOM transmission in general (e.g., Ryu and Feick 2007), prior research has not 
considered how marketers can influence receiver selection. Thus, our contribution lies in 
demonstrating how mechanisms can be used as “nudges” that affect transmitters’ receiver 
selections in specific ways that can help marketers achieve their goals. 
                                                 
5
 A noteworthy exception is Frenzen and Nakamoto (1993), who indirectly consider consumers’ WOM receiver 
choices with respect to transmission preferences for strong- versus weak-tied associates. 
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2. Background and Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Prior Literature 
 As already noted, the current research is related to a number of research streams in 
marketing, as well as work on the role of incentives in large-scale social mobilization efforts in 
non-marketing contexts (Pickard 2011; Rutherford et al. 2013a, 2014b). A large body of research 
considers how marketers can encourage customers to talk about their products and services with 
their friends, and the positive effects WOM can have on firm outcomes such as customer 
acquisition, retention, and sales (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Godes and Mayzlin 2004; 
Goldenberg, Libai, and Muller 2001, 2004; Stephen and Galak 2012; Trusov, Bucklin, and 
Pauwels 2009). The literature on customer value (e.g., Kumar et al. 2007; Kumar et al. 2010) 
also considers WOM in terms of customer-to-customer referrals, demonstrating that an important 
part of customer value comes from WOM referrals (see also Schmitt et al. 2011). 
 Research on WOM referral incentives or rewards is closely related to the current work. 
Studies on referral incentives consider factors such as the design of optimal reward programs to 
encourage customers to generate referrals (Biyalogorsky et al. 2001), when referral rewards 
increase existing customers’ referral transmission likelihoods, and for what types of brands they 
are best suited (Ryu and Feick 2007). Other research considers receiver’s reactions to WOM. 
Verlegh et al. (2013) show that receivers can react adversely because of suspicions of 
incentivized referrers having ulterior motives. Finally, Schmitt et al. (2011) find that referred 
customers are more valuable over time (e.g., less churn, more spending). Interestingly, this effect 
could be due to existing customers having superior knowledge of friends’ interests and needs 
(compared to the firm), and therefore being able to find friends to refer to a firm who are a better 
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match for the firm’s offerings. More generally, this suggests it would be advantageous for firms 
to leverage customers’ knowledge of friends’ characteristics such as social connectivity. 
 
2.2 Mechanism for Influencing Transmission to Higher-Connectivity Friends 
We propose a mechanism for increasing the likelihood that WOM-transmitting customers 
select higher-connectivity friends as receivers. Incentives or rewards for transmitting WOM have 
been shown to work well in marketing settings in general (Ryu and Feick 2007), and the design 
of a promotion can influence transmitters’ receiver choices (Frenzen and Nakamoto 1993). The 
social mobilization literature considers mechanisms designed to solve particular types of 
problems. For example, to win a contest in which teams had to find ten red weather balloons that 
the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency placed at random locations, Pickard et al. 
(2011) implemented a “recursive” incentive mechanism that mobilized large numbers of people 
to search local areas.
6
 Pickard et al. (2011) argue that appropriate incentives are a key ingredient 
for successful social mobilization. Other studies in contexts such as collaborative problem 
solving and crowdsourcing also underscore the importance of incentives for regulating flows of 
information among socially connected actors in a manner that fosters desirable outcomes (e.g., 
Dodds, Muhamad, and Watts 2003; Mason and Watts 2009). In our context, a mechanism will be 
effective if it encourages transmitters to select higher-connectivity friends as receivers. 
To increase the probability of higher-connectivity receivers being selected, the social 
connectivity of one’s potential receivers must be both considered by transmitters and deemed to 
be important. In other words, transmitters need to put some weight on receiver connectivity when 
deciding with whom they will share information. One way to encourage this to happen is to use 
                                                 
6
 See Pickard et al. (2011) for full details. Interestingly, their recursive incentive mechanism shared some similarities 
with “pyramid” incentive mechanisms that typically are illegal in person-to-person or “network” selling programs. 
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an incentive mechanism that makes a transmitter’s utility from sharing information with friends 
positively associated with the social connectivity of the transmitted-to friends. This will not 
happen naturally; it is unlikely that a regular consumer—as WOM transmitter—will put weight 
on the social connectivity of potential receivers without some inducement. This was shown to be 
the case in a pretest in which 448 U.S. members of Amazon Mechanical Turk were surveyed 
about WOM transmission. Respondents were asked to list receiver characteristics that they 
consider important when they decide with whom to share information via WOM. Only 3.8% of 
respondents mentioned something related to social connectivity (see Web Appendix A). 
Given that transmitters do not typically consider receiver connectivity, how can 
marketers increase preference for higher-connectivity receivers? We posit that this can be 
achieved by satisfying two conditions. First, the macro-level faster-diffusion outcome must be 
important to transmitters. Second, transmitters must feel a sense of urgency with respect to 
deriving utility from their WOM transmission. Taken together, this means that, for example, 
transmitters should personally want many others to know about a talked-about product in as little 
time as possible, and feel some time pressure.  
 
2.3 Making Faster-Diffusion Outcomes More Important to Transmitters 
For receiver connectivity to positively influence a transmitter’s receiver choice, a 
transmitter’s individual, micro-level transmission utility needs to be positively associated with 
the macro-level firm-desired faster-diffusion outcome. In other words, transmitters need to care 
about faster diffusion (or social mobilization) and associate this with higher-connectivity 
receivers. If people possess an intuitive lay belief that diffusion will speed up when higher-
 9 
connectivity people are involved, then they will have a preference for higher-connectivity 
receivers when they want the information they are transmitting to spread quickly. 
Evidence of the prevalence of this lay belief was found in a pretest. We surveyed 100 
U.S. members of Amazon Mechanical Turk and asked them to consider two scenarios. For the 
first scenario, they imagined that a friend posted a video on Facebook. We then asked them to 
select from a list of factors, including how funny the video was and, critically, the transmitter’s 
level of social connectivity (number of friends), which ones they thought would affect how 
quickly the video would spread. Eighty-seven percent of respondents said that the video would 
spread faster if it was shared with someone who has many friends, i.e., higher connectivity.  
For the second scenario, respondents imagined four new restaurants opening in their city 
and four different people transmitting WOM about each of these restaurants. The transmitters’ 
levels of social connectivity varied (below average, average, above average, and well above 
average numbers of friends). Respondents had to indicate which restaurant they thought people 
in their city would hear about first (i.e., would have the fastest diffusion). Eighty-three percent of 
respondents believed that news of the restaurant talked about by the person with “well above 
average” connectivity would spread the fastest.  
Finally, we asked respondents to indicate on three five-point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree) the extent to which they believed that faster diffusion would result 
from information being shared by a higher-connectivity person (“People with many social 
connections/friends are important for spreading information,” “When a person with many social 
connections shares news with others it spreads quickly,” and “If a person with many social 
connections shares information it will spread like wildfire”). The means (SDs) for the three items 
were 4.05 (.72), 4.11 (.60), and 3.98 (.75), and the percentages indicating “agree” or “strongly 
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agree” on these scales were 83%, 92%, and 79%. Thus, based on this pretest, people appear a 
have a lay belief about fast diffusion and connectivity consistent with our conceptualization.  
Our proposed mechanism for encouraging or “nudging” transmissions to higher-
connectivity receivers is based on taking advantage of this lay belief. Specifically, it involves 
linking a regular consumer’s expected transmission utility to the number of other people who 
will possess the transmitted information (i.e., the eventual number of “informed” people). In this 
situation, transmitters should have an incentive to favor higher-connectivity friends as receivers. 
This is related to prior research on interdependent consumer choice in which one’s utility is 
influenced by, or is partly a function of, others’ utilities (e.g., Yang and Allenby 2003). More 
generally, it is based on the (positive) network externality concept in economics, which is where 
a “network good” (i.e., with a positive externality) is more valuable to a consumer as the number 
of consumers owning or using that good increases (e.g., Economides 1996; Katz and Shapiro 
1985; Leibenstein 1950).
7
 We consider positive externalities in information that consumers 
transmit to friends via WOM. If the transmitted information has a positive externality, based on 
the above logic, transmitters should have a preference for higher-connectivity receivers. 
 We consider two ways that information can have a positive externality. First, it can be 
inherent to the good to which the information refers. In other words, the product or service can 
be a network good, such as a communication technology (e.g., historically, fax machines; 
recently, social media platforms). When the item is a network good, marketers can encourage 
higher-connectivity receiver selection by making the externality salient. Second, for non-network 
goods, marketers can use tactics such as promotions to introduce a positive externality.
8
 Instead 
                                                 
7
 Although not considered here, negative externalities are also possible. This occurs if information value decreases 
as it becomes widely known, creating a transmission disincentive (e.g., Frenzen and Nakamoto 1993). 
8
 Although it was a negative externality, the scarce price discount in Frenzen and Nakamoto (1993) is an example of 
how externalities can be introduced through marketing tactics. 
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of rewarding a customer for making WOM transmissions or referrals directly, a promotion-based 
mechanism could make rewards contingent on macro-level diffusion outcomes. This approach 
has been used in practice by “daily deal” websites, “flash sales” retailers, and crowdfunding 
platforms such as Kickstarter. For example, a transmitter might be tempted with a deep discount 
that is only realized if a minimum number of consumers sign up for that deal. In sum, this gives 
rise to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Receiver connectivity (and the probability of selecting higher-connectivity 
receivers) will be higher when the information to be transmitted has a positive 
externality (either inherently or introduced through marketing tactics). 
 Also, as discussed earlier, preference for higher-connectivity receivers is expected to be 
higher under a positive externality because this makes faster macro-level diffusion more 
important and relevant to transmitters. Thus, the positive effect of a mechanism that makes 
salient an inherent externality or introduces it through marketing tactics will be mediated by a 
transmitter’s belief in the importance of faster macro-level diffusion. Stated formally: 
H2: The positive effect of a positive-externality mechanism on receiver connectivity 
will be mediated by transmitter-perceived importance of faster diffusion. 
The second condition for a mechanism to make the transmitter’s weight on receiver 
connectivity more positive is that there must be a sense of urgency or limited time for achieving 
fast diffusion. Urgency or limited time is posited to be a moderator of the effects predicted in H1 
and H2. If it does not matter how long it will take for information to spread, diffusion speed will 
not be important to transmitters. Accordingly, when faster diffusion is unimportant (even if 
diffusion in general is important), a positive-externality mechanism should not strongly influence 
a transmitter’s preference for higher-connectivity receivers. Stated formally: 
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H3: The positive effect of a positive-externality mechanism on receiver connectivity, 
mediated by transmitter-perceived importance of faster diffusion, will be 
enhanced when transmitters feel a sense of urgency for the diffusion outcome. 
 
2.4 Summary and Overview of Studies 
Our conceptual framework is summarized in Figure 1. We propose that an important 
firm-desired macro-level goal for consumer WOM marketing campaigns—faster information 
diffusion or social mobilization—can be made more likely through the use of marketer-initiated 
mechanisms that encourage or “nudge” WOM-transmitting customers to select higher-
connectivity friends as receivers. The proposed mechanisms make transmissions to higher-
connectivity friends more likely by influencing how important faster diffusion is to transmitters, 
particularly when transmitters feel a sense of urgency.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We test our hypotheses with three experiments and a simulation. Study 1 tests H1 in the 
context of a “refer a friend” WOM campaign setting where the externality is inherent and is 
made salient. Study 2 replicates this in a different context where the externality is introduced 
through a promotional offer, and tests H2 and H3. Study 3 is a field experiment that replicates a 
key part of Study 2 in different setting, and provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
the selection of higher-connectivity receivers and faster diffusion. Finally, Study 4 is a 
simulation that demonstrates how making it more likely that higher-connectivity receivers are 
chosen can lead to faster macro-level diffusion, and also compares this approach to a common 
approach used in practice, hub seeding. 
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3. Study 1 
This study tests H1 by showing that a positive-externality mechanism can increase the 
social connectivity of nominated receivers in a “refer a friend” WOM campaign. The mechanism 
makes an inherent externality salient, and compares this to a control condition where the 
externality is also present but not made salient. This allows us to test the effectiveness of making 
an inherent externality salient in the case of network goods (non-network goods are considered in 
Study 2). This is a field experiment in which participants made actual transmission decisions. 
 
3.1 Design and Procedure  
Sixty undergraduate students at a large U.S. university participated in this field 
experiment for course credit as part of an hour-long laboratory session. At the end of the session 
(after completing other tasks that were unrelated to this experiment), participants were asked to 
provide their email address for a mailing list that would be used to advertise future sessions in a 
new lab facility that allowed them to earn cash instead of course credit.
9
 Participants were then 
asked to nominate (i.e., refer) a friend who was also a student at the university who they thought 
would also like to be on the email list (i.e., who they thought would be relevant). We then asked 
some questions about this person, including how socially well connected this friend is (1 = not at 
all, 5 = extremely socially connected), which was used as the dependent variable.
10
  
Participants were given a cover story, which varied according to the condition to which 
participants were randomly assigned. The experiment used a 2(control, externality) between-
                                                 
9
 To increase the realism of the task, before exposure to the manipulation, participants were also asked (i) how 
interested they were in participating in more lab sessions (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely), (ii) how long these sessions 
should ideally be, (iii) their ideal hourly pay rate, and (iv) how often they want to participate (1 = never, 7 = daily).  
10
 Other questions were asked to reduce potential for hypothesis guessing: (i) college year, (ii) business major 
(yes/no), (iii) how well this person is known to the participant (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely well), and (iv) will they 
be interested in paid lab sessions (yes/no). 
 14 
subjects single-factor design. In the control condition, participants were told to nominate a friend 
because “We need your help spreading the word [about the new paid-participation opportunity].” 
In the externality condition, participants were told the same, plus reminded that unless enough 
students signed up for these paid-participation experiment sessions, it was unlikely that they 
would have the opportunity to earn extra money because sessions would not be scheduled or, if 
they were, could be canceled because the minimum number of required participants might not be 
achieved (see Web Appendix B). Our intention with this manipulation was to make salient an 
inherent positive externality that existed in both conditions, i.e., the opportunity to make extra 
money in this lab always depends on sessions running, which depends on having enough 
students in the participant pool. This is a subtle externality and without being explicitly made 
aware of it, people would be unlikely to think of it themselves. Thus, this study is a fairly 
conservative test of H1. 
 
3.2 Results  
Mean receiver connectivity for each condition is plotted in Figure 2. Consistent with H1, 
an ANOVA revealed that connectivity of the nominated friend is higher in the externality 
condition (Mexternality = 3.84 vs. Mcontrol = 3.21, F(1, 58) = 7.01, p = .01). Thus, a mechanism that 
simply draws attention to an inherent externality can be effective. Explicit incentive mechanisms 
are therefore not always necessary, although they can be effective when marketing non-network 
goods, as we show in Study 2. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to receiver connectivity, we measured two other receiver characteristics to 
mask the dependent variable and to minimize potential demand bias. Our manipulation had no 
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effect on whether chosen receivers were expected to be interested in participating in lab studies 
(2(1) < 1, p = .55; overall, 88% of participants said their receiver would be interested). The 
other measure was how well the participant felt they knew their chosen receiver (i.e., tie 
strength). This was affected by the manipulation, though not as strongly as the dependent 
variable was (Mexternality = 4.44 vs. Mcontrol = 3.96; (F(1, 58) = 4.14, p = .046). Importantly, when 
this variable was included as a covariate in the main analysis, the positive effect of the 
manipulation on receiver connectivity remained significant (F(1, 57) = 4.42, p = .039). 
A possible limitation of this study is how receiver connectivity was measured, i.e., as the 
transmitter’s perception of their nominated friend’s social connectivity. Prior research suggests 
that perceptions sometimes do not capture reality (e.g., Krackhardt 1987). Social connectivity 
measurement research uses two types of measures: perceptual (our approach) and sociometric 
(using network data) (e.g., Parkhurst and Hopmeyer 1998). Sociometric measures are thought to 
be superior because they are based on the actual number of friends people have, but accessing 
such data is often impossible. Thus, for practical reasons, researchers often rely on perceptions. 
In any case, if a transmitter considers connectivity when selecting a receiver, it will be 
perceptional, since regular people do not have accurate sociometric data on their friends. Further, 
popularity research suggests that perceptions of others’ social connectivity are decent indicators 
of sociometric connectivity (i.e., these measures are moderately-to-strongly positively correlated; 
e.g., Kleck, Reese, Ziegerer-Behnken, and Sundar 2007; Parkhurst and Hopmeyer 1998). 
 
4. Study 2 
 The previous study showed how making an inherent externality salient causes 
transmitters to be more likely to select higher-connectivity receivers, consistent with H1. The 
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purpose of this next study is to show a similar effect for a non-network good where the 
externality is introduced (vs. made salient) through a marketing promotion. Additionally, this 
study tests H2 and H3; i.e., it provides evidence that higher-connectivity receivers are preferred 
when a positive-externality mechanism is used because this increases transmitters’ perceptions of 
the importance of fast diffusion, particularly when this is urgent. 
 
4.1 Design and Procedure 
Three-hundred and sixty-nine U.S. members of Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in 
this experiment for a nominal monetary payment. Participants considered a scenario where they 
received an email from Amazon announcing a “flash sale” on Amazon gift cards, where cards 
with face values up to $250 could be purchased at 50% off. Participants were randomly assigned 
to conditions in a 2(control, externality) x 2(not urgent, urgent) between-subjects design.  
Since the product here is a non-network good, the manipulation introduced an externality 
instead of making an inherent externality salient. To be realistic and familiar to participants, the 
manipulation was designed to be similar to methods used to encourage WOM by crowdfunding 
platforms such as Kickstarter (i.e., where a minimum amount of funding is needed to be 
successful) and “daily deals” services such as Groupon. In the control condition, participants 
were told that there was “no catch” to this offer and they could take advantage of it by using a 
discount code at any time during the offer period (see Web Appendix B). The offer period was 
seven days in the not-urgent condition, and one day in the urgent condition. In the externality 
condition, participants were told that there was a “catch” such that for the discount to be received 
a “minimum of 50,000 people must make a gift card purchase” within the offer period.11 After 
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 To be realistic, it was stated in the externality condition that if this minimum was not met there was no charge. 
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the email, participants indicated how likely they would be, on a 0-100 percent scale, to share this 
offer with a higher-connectivity friend. This was the dependent variable. 
Next, we measured the mediator, desire for fast diffusion, with two seven-point Likert-
scaled items (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; “I want many other people to know about 
this offer as quickly as possible” and “I want many other people to share this offer soon”; r = 
.87). Included with these two items (in random presentation order) we measured desire for 
widespread (but not necessarily faster) diffusion using three items (“It is important to me that 
many other people redeem this offer,” “I want many other people to know about this offer” and 
“I do not care if many other people redeem this offer” [reversed];  = .85), and desire for faster 
(but not necessarily widespread) diffusion with a single item (“I want word of this offer to spread 
as quickly as possible”). These additional items were included to enable us to show that the 
externality effect on the probability of transmitting to a higher-connectivity friend is mediated by 
desire for information to spread widely and quickly, not just widely or quickly.
12
 
 
4.2 Results  
First, we compared mean higher-connectivity receiver transmission probabilities between 
the control and externality conditions. Consistent with H1, an ANOVA revealed a positive effect 
of externality (Mexternality = 73.57 vs. Mcontrol = 62.22, F(1, 367) = 10.48, p = .001). When urgency 
was included in the model and interacted with externality, the main effect of externality was 
again positive and significant (F(1, 385) = 10.55, p = .001). The urgency main effect, however, 
was not significant (p = .35). The externality-by-urgency interaction was also not significant, but 
somewhat stronger (F(1,385) = 2.33, p = .13). Contrasts testing for the simple effect of 
                                                 
12
 The three composite items for the mediator and the two alternatives were, as expected, highly positively correlated 
(rs > .86), despite the important but subtle conceptual distinctions between them. 
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externality at each level of urgency showed a significant positive simple effect of externality 
when the faster-diffusion outcome was urgent (1 day; Mexternality = 77.94 vs. Mcontrol = 61.23, F(1, 
365) = 11.47, p = .001). When the outcome was not urgent, the simple effect of externality was 
not significant (7 days; Mexternality = 69.30 vs. Mcontrol = 63.26, F(1, 365) = 1.47, p = .23).  
We next tested the moderated-mediation process (H2 and H3). We expected that the 
positive externality effect on preference for transmitting to higher-connectivity receivers occurs 
through an increased desire for faster diffusion, and that this effect would be stronger when the 
outcome is more urgent. A conditional indirect effects test (Hayes 2013, model 8) supported our 
predictions. There was a significant positive indirect effect of the externality on the probability 
of transmitting to a higher-connectivity friend through desire for fast diffusion. This was stronger 
in the urgent condition (indirect effect of externality = 12.85, SE = 1.93, 95% C.I. = [9.16, 16.73] 
vs. not-urgent indirect effect of externality = 6.80, SE = 1.79, 95% C.I. = [3.31, 10.33]). 
Finally, we attempted to distinguish between a desire for widespread (but not necessarily 
faster) diffusion and a desire for faster (but not necessarily widespread) diffusion as mediators, 
using the two additional constructs measured alongside the desire for faster diffusion mediator. 
We repeated the moderated-mediation analysis but replaced the mediator with these two 
alternatives operating in parallel. Given that these alternative mediators are highly correlated (r = 
.86), and they are both highly correlated with the main mediator, we expected to find that both 
operated as mediators in a manner consistent with the above-reported results. This was the case 
(widespread but not fast indirect effect of interaction = .92, SE = .49, 95% C.I. = [.16, 2.13]; fast 
but not widespread indirect effect of interaction = 1.76, SE = .95, 95% C.I. = [.04, 3.80]). 
Consistent with our theory, the moderated-mediation was stronger through faster (but not 
necessarily widespread) diffusion than through widespread (but not necessarily faster) diffusion. 
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5. Study 3 
The previous study showed how an externality can be introduced through a marketing 
tactic, which can make consumers more likely to transmit to higher-connectivity friends, 
consistent with H1. Additionally, we showed how this occurs through a desire for fast diffusion, 
particularly when the outcome is reasonably urgent, in line with H2 and H3. The purpose of this 
next study is to (i) provide further process evidence in support of H2, (ii) do this using a different 
mediator operationalization and in a different context, and (iii) show a link between the increased 
likelihood of transmitters selecting higher-connectivity receivers and macro-level faster 
diffusion. This study is a field experiment. 
 
5.1 Design and Procedure 
Ninety-seven U.S. members of Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in this study for a 
nominal monetary payment. The context was a public health communication in the form of a 
public service announcement (PSA) from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control about the 
importance of getting a seasonal influenza vaccination (i.e., flu shot). Participants were assigned 
to one of two conditions in a 2(control, externality) between-subjects single-factor design. Faster 
diffusion was urgent in both conditions (i.e., we did not manipulate urgency in this study). The 
study was conducted in late September (before the typical U.S. flu season has begun). To create 
a sense of urgency, participants were told that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control expected the 
flu season to start early, and were therefore advised to get their flu shot by early October (i.e., 
within one or two weeks of the study). Importantly, participants were told that they could help 
reduce the risk of a flu outbreak by telling a friend about the importance of getting a flu shot, and 
were asked to inform a friend by emailing them a link to the official government flu information 
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website, Flu.gov. Each condition had its own unique link that participants were asked to share 
with a friend that could be tracked (for measuring macro-level diffusion speed), and participants 
were aware that this link was unique and trackable.  
The mechanism for manipulating externality was somewhat similar to the manipulation 
used in Study 2. In the externality condition, participants were offered an incentive for emailing 
this link to a friend that was designed to encourage them to email a higher-connectivity friend. 
The incentive was a bonus payment (double their payment for participating in the study) if 50 or 
more people visited Flu.gov via their unique link over the next seven days. There was no such 
incentive offered in the control condition. After reading the PSA, participants were given a few 
minutes to think about one friend to whom they wanted to email the trackable link. A webpage-
based form was used for sending the email. Participants entered their friend’s email address and 
a message. The software automatically sent this message via email to the designated receiver’s 
address, included the link to Flu.gov in the email, and tracked email sending and clicks on links.  
After sending the email, participants responded to items similar to those used in Study 1. 
Receiver connectivity, the dependent variable, was measured similar to Study 1, with two five-
point items (“How social is this person?” 1 = not at all, has very few friends/connections, 5 = 
extremely, has a very large number of friends/connections; “How socially well connected is this 
person relative to other people you know?” 1 = well below average social connectivity, 5 = well 
above average social connectivity; r = .76). We also measured two additional receiver 
characteristics: tie strength (five-point scale, “How well do you know this person?” 1 = not at all, 
5 = extremely well), and perceived receiver interest (five-point scale, “Do you think this person 
will be interested in hearing about flu vaccinations?” 1 = definitely no, 5 = definitely yes). 
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Perceived receiver interest was used as a mediating variable in this study, as an indirect 
measure of the underlying conceptual mediating construct, desire for faster diffusion. Although 
this is quite different from the measure used in Study 2, we employed this indirect approach for 
an important reason. The measure in Study 2 refers directly to the macro-level faster-diffusion 
construct, which, although it matches our conceptualization, might have been difficult for 
participants to conceive of given that they think at a micro, not macro, level in this setting. Thus, 
in this study we tried to measure the underlying conceptual mediator in a manner that was easier 
and more relatable for participants. The specific measure—perceived receiver interest—is a 
characteristic that transmitters plausibly think of when selecting receivers. Importantly, this is 
likely to be a strong correlate of the underlying macro-focused mediator, desire for faster 
diffusion. This is because if the faster-diffusion outcome is important to a transmitter, it should 
be important to them that the receiver is interested in the topic since interest means they are 
likely to listen, which is necessary if that receiver is to retransmit the information to others 
(which is needed for faster diffusion). 
 
5.2 Results 
To test that the positive externality effect on receiver connectivity operates through desire 
for faster diffusion (H2), we performed a conditional indirect effects test (Hayes 2013, model 4). 
Consistent with H2, the positive externality mechanism had a positive and significant indirect 
effect on nominated receiver connectivity (indirect effect = .06, SE = .04, 95% C.I. = [.01, .16]).  
We did the same analysis with tie strength as the dependent variable. The purpose of this 
was to show that the externality affects a particular aspect of receiver selection related to the 
faster-diffusion outcome and not other aspects, such as whether more- or less-close friends are 
 22 
receivers. Based on our conceptualization, tie strength should not be affected because how close 
a friend a potential receiver is to a transmitter should not matter with respect to a transmitter’s 
perception of their ability to spread information quickly throughout their networks. Consistent 
with this, we found no evidence suggesting that positive interdependence affects transmitter-
receiver tie strength (direct effect p = .31; indirect effect = .02, SE = .03, 95% C.I. = [-.02, .09]). 
Finally, because participants emailed trackable links we were able to see if macro-level 
fast diffusion was higher in the positive interdependence condition. Because the incentive said 
that bonus payments would be made if enough diffusion occurred within a fixed timeframe of 
seven days, an appropriate measure of macro-level fast diffusion is simply Flu.gov link clicks 
over seven days.
13
 In the control condition, the link-click rate was 7.02%, which was 
significantly lower than in the positive interdependence condition, where the rate was 41.94% (Z 
= 4.40, p < .001). While this result should be treated as tentative because we had no observation 
of the link-diffusion process beyond the nominated receiver, the difference is convincingly large. 
 
6. Study 4 
The three previous studies focused on demonstrating how making an externality salient 
(network goods) or introducing an externality through marketing tactics (non-network goods) 
can make regular-consumer transmitters more likely to transmit WOM to higher-connectivity 
receivers. In this study, we show how an increased preference for higher-connectivity receivers 
can lead to macro-level faster diffusion. This study uses a simulation for this purpose. Our 
approach is in the tradition of work in the diffusion literature that has used simulations and 
agent-based modeling (e.g., Goldenberg et al. 2001, 2004; Lusch and Tay 2004; Libai et al. 
2013; Rand and Rust 2011).  
                                                 
13
 This is expressed as a link-click rate or click-through rate; i.e., clicks as a percentage of sent links. 
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6.1 Model of Individual-Level Behavior and WOM Transmission 
Our model follows existing individual-level diffusion models (e.g., Goldenberg et al. 
2001, 2004; Toubia, Goldenberg, and Garcia 2014) that are related to the classic Bass (1969) 
diffusion model. To allow us to test the extent to which a preference for higher-connectivity 
receivers affects diffusion speed, we included a parameter that represents the weight (i.e., 
importance) that transmitters put on receiver connectivity when selecting receivers. We used this 
as a way to model the effect of the externality manipulations used in the previous studies, since 
making salient or introducing a positive externality had the effect of making receiver 
connectivity more important to transmitters.   
Consider a population of N people, each of whom is a node in a social network.
14
 Person i 
(for i = 1, …, N) is connected to di > 0 others. Here we operationalize information diffusion as 
awareness of a product spreading across the network in discrete time (t = 1, …, T). Person i’s 
awareness of the product at the end of period t is state variable 0 ≤ ait ≤ 1, with ait = 1 (ait = 0) 
meaning that person i is  “completely aware” (“completely unaware”) of the product. At t = 0, 
ai,0 = 0 except for a small group of “seeds” who have aseeds,0 = 1 to start the diffusion process. 
The WOM transmission process involves two steps. First, people with ai,t-1 > 0 might 
transmit WOM in period t. Awareness corresponds to the extent to which the product is “top of 
mind,” and the more top of mind a product is, the more likely a person is to transmit WOM about 
that product at that time. They can, however, choose to “stay silent” despite having nonzero 
awareness. Transmission is impossible if ai,t-1 = 0 since the person is unaware. Thus, first we 
decide whether or not person i in period t will transmit, with the rule as follows: if Bernoulli(ai,t-
1) = 1 person i transmits in period t (otherwise they will “stay silent”). Then, if Bernoulli(ai,t-1) = 
                                                 
14
 Consistent with what is commonly found in real-world social networks, we assume that this network is sparse and 
scale free, meaning that the number of connections nodes have is power-law distributed (Barabasi and Albert 1999). 
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1, we allow person i in period t to transmit to any of their di friends. For persons i and j who are 
connected, the probability that i transmits to j in period t is defined as ptransmitijt = exp(αdj)/[1 + 
exp(αdj)]. The critical parameter is α (≥ 0), the importance weight that person i puts on friend j’s 
social connectivity (dj) when “deciding” if they will transmit the information to them. When α = 
0 receiver connectivity does not matter to transmitters; i.e., ptransmitijt = .50. As α increases, 
ptransmitijt increases. The transmission rule is as follows: if Bernoulli(ptransmitijt) = 1 person i 
will transmit to person j in period t. This is similar to the model in Toubia et al. (2014). 
We then consider how WOM transmission affects selected receivers. To be conservative 
and realistic, we accommodate the possibility that people do not listen. Receiver j has dj ≥ xjt 
friends, where xjt is the number of j’s friends who chose to transmit to j in period t. Following 
Toubia et al. (2014), the hazard of j becoming completely aware of the product in period t (ajt = 
1) is preceivejt =P(a jt =1)=1- (1- p)(1-q)
x jt , where the parameters p and q are coefficients of 
“external” influence (e.g., advertising) and “internal” influence (WOM) similar to those in the 
Bass diffusion model. If Bernoulli(preceivejt) = 1, receiver j is aware of the product at the end of 
period t (i.e., ajt = 1). Finally, for realism, we allow awareness to decrease between periods, 
which captures forgetting, memory decay, distractions, or the presence of other things to talk 
about. Thus, we multiply end-of-period awareness ait by (1 – δ), where 0 ≤ δ < 1, to arrive at an 
end-of-period awareness level for each person that carries over to the start of the next period. 
 
6.2 Simulation Design 
This model of WOM transmission behavior was used to simulate thousands of diffusion 
processes over a N = 1,000 social network with a realistic structure. The network was randomly 
generated, was “scale free” with exponent parameter = 2.19 (which is in the typical 2-3 range; 
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Barabasi and Albert 1999), and had mean degree of 3.99 (i.e., on average, a person in this 
network has approximately four friends). Thus, the network used was typical of real-world social 
networks, particularly offline social networks. The simulation was a full-factorial experiment in 
which five parameters were varied. First, and most important, weight on receiver connectivity, α 
= {0, .20, .40, .60, .80, 1.00, 1.20}. Second, coefficient of external influence, p = {0, .01, .02, 
.03, .04}. Third, coefficient of internal influence, q = {.10, .20, .30, .40}. The p and q ranges 
follow Sultan, Farley, and Lehmann (1990). Fourth, awareness decay, δ = {0, .20}. Fifth, number 
of seed nodes completely aware at t = 0, Nseeds = {5, 10}, which corresponds to seeding .5% and 
1% of the population as is typical in seeding campaigns. Seeds were selected randomly in each 
run. The full factorial design had 560 cells and we ran the simulation five times per cell for 
robustness. Each run covered T = 365 periods, mimicking daily diffusion over one year. 
 A second set of simulations was run with “hub seeding” instead of random seed seeding 
(e.g., Hinz et al. 2011). This allowed us to compare results to a situation in which a firm can 
directly target higher-connectivity individuals as seeds. Hubs were identified using Goldenberg 
et al.’s (2009) criterion of a node having degree greater than or equal to three standard deviations 
above the network’s mean degree. We randomly sampled Nseeds from the set of identified hub 
nodes. The mean degree of the seeds was 3.99 when randomly selected from all nodes versus 
40.16 when randomly selected from the subset of hub nodes. Since typical hub seeding does not 
employ the externality-based mechanism we focus on, α = 0 in the hub seeding condition. 
 
6.3 Results 
The dependent variable in our analysis is diffusion speed, measured for each simulation 
run as the maximum number of people (nodes) who became aware of the product during the 
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simulation divided by the number of periods it took to reach this maximum. Diffusion speed was 
regressed on each of the five varied model parameters. We included a random effect to control 
for multiple simulation runs for each combination of model parameters. Overall, we used 2,800 
observations from 560 cells.  
As expected, the weight on receiver connectivity (α) had a significant positive effect on 
diffusion speed (b = 9.44, t = 19.28, p < .001).
15
 Mean diffusion speeds at each level of this 
parameter are plotted in Figure 3 (averaging over the levels of the other parameters; error bars 
are one standard error above/below the means). As this figure shows, diffusion speed increases 
as transmitters’ preference for receiver connectivity gets stronger. This demonstrates that the 
externality-based mechanisms tested in the previous studies that affect transmitters’ receiver 
selection behaviors can lead to faster information diffusion at the macro level.
16
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 We compared this to hub seeding. The first point on the left-hand side of Figure 3 
represents the case of hub seeding with zero weight on receiver connectivity (α = 0), which is 
good representation of standard practice in seeded WOM campaigns. Hub seeding outperforms 
non-hub (i.e., random, regular consumer) seeding only if seeds put zero weight on receiver 
connectivity (t = 2.00, p = .05). However, when randomly selected, regular-consumer seeds put 
weight on receiver connectivity, hub seeding is inferior in terms of diffusion speed, even for 
small values of α. This is important because it means that strong externality mechanisms are not 
required. More broadly, it shows that externality-based inducements can be superior to hub 
seeding as a way to speed-up diffusion. 
                                                 
15
 All other varied parameters had a significant effect on diffusion speed, except for seed size. 
16
 As a robustness check, we also ran this analysis for the numerator and denominator of diffusion speed separately. 
The results were consistent: increasing weight on receiver connectivity increases the number of people who become 
aware in a set period of time, and decreases time taken to reach maximum awareness or time to peak. 
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7. Discussion and Implications 
Given the importance of customer-driven WOM communications to marketers, it is not 
surprising that multiple streams of research consider various facets of WOM marketing and, 
most relevant to the current research, WOM-based referrals and seeded WOM campaigns. 
Despite the large extant body of research, few studies have considered consumers’ transmission 
behaviors with respect to types of receivers chosen. Moreover, using mechanisms or incentives 
to encourage regular WOM-transmitting consumers to select certain types of friends as receivers 
has not been previously explored. Our results show how marketers can move beyond merely 
encouraging customers to transmit WOM to anyone by implementing straightforward 
mechanisms to get consumers to target their transmissions at a particular type of receiver. In 
other words, it is possible to “nudge” consumers to select a certain type of receiver—higher-
connectivity friends, in this case—by leveraging network effects with simple marketing tactics or 
incentive-based promotions. We also showed that this occurs because transmitters then have a 
stronger desire for fast diffusion, which suggests that positive-externality mechanisms can be 
used to align certain aspects of individuals’ transmission objectives with a firm’s goals (in this 
case, faster diffusion). Theoretically, this implies that effective mechanisms for influencing 
consumers’ WOM transmission behaviors work by getting transmitters to think about—and buy 
into—the firm’s intentions and objectives. This does not mean that complete “goal alignment” is 
necessary, but rather that a mechanism will operate well if it gets customers to be cognizant of 
(and in favor of) the firm-desired consequence of their WOM-transmission actions. 
We focused specifically on encouraging micro-level receiver selection decisions that can 
help give rise to faster information diffusion (or “high-speed diffusion”). This is an important 
marketing objective when relying on WOM to spread information about brands, products, and 
 28 
services. A key implication of the current research is that marketers do not need to go to great 
lengths to identify, recruit, and active “special” consumers—such as so-called “hubs” with high 
levels of social connectivity. Marketers can instead seed information with regular consumers (or 
randomly) and use externality-based mechanisms such as those tested here to encourage 
transmitter behaviors that will make faster diffusion more likely. While suggested in the 
literature on diffusion over networks (e.g., Adamic et al. 2001; Goldenberg et al. 2009) and in 
the viral seeding literature (e.g., Hinz et al. 2011), it helps to have higher-connectivity people 
involved, marketers can use regular consumers to get information to these individuals instead of 
seeking them directly. Having higher-connectivity people as receivers is important when 
marketers cannot easily directly reach these people and encourage them to transmit WOM, which 
is often the case in practice. 
Our approach using positive-externality mechanisms that either make an inherent 
externality salient for network goods, or introduce it through marketing tactics for non-network 
goods, is novel and can be easily used by marketers. The manipulations we used could be used in 
practice with, at most, minor modifications. Our findings also present marketers with a viable 
alternative to directly targeting higher-connectivity customers through viral “hub” seeding 
practices, which in many cases is either impossible or expensive and might not work because 
hubs could be less susceptible to influence, or sought-after by many firms at the same time. The 
approach has the advantage of being usable with regular customers (i.e., anyone), involves 
simple “tweaks” to existing marketing messaging or promotional tactics, and is efficient because 
it takes advantage of consumers’ knowledge of their own social networks which is likely 
superior to the knowledge possessed by marketers of consumers’ social connections. 
Additionally, although not tested in our studies, we expect our approach to be complementary to 
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other efforts to generate faster diffusion, such as hub seeding or using seeds with other special 
characteristics, such as “opinion leaders” or “influencers.” 
Theoretically, an important aspect of the current research is shifting the focus on 
transmitter selection (“Who is the transmitter?”) in extant literature to receiver selection (“To 
whom is information transmitted?”), and, critically, how marketers can influence regular 
consumers’ receiver selection decisions in desirable ways. Practically, the externality-based 
approach employed here is straightforward and easily implementable by marketers. While it is 
common to offer incentives of various kinds to consumers in exchange for WOM transmissions, 
the status quo is concerned with getting the transmissions to take place, irrespective of who the 
receivers are. This is not suboptimal because it will not necessarily expedite information 
diffusion. Our approach is therefore especially useful when faster diffusion is desired, which is 
likely to be the case most of the time. 
The current work is not without limitations. First, we focused entirely on receiver 
connectivity and how to increase transmissions to higher-connectivity friends. Although we 
demonstrated that it is possible to use externality-based mechanisms to achieve this, it would be 
interesting for future research to explore how other social transmission behaviors can be 
encouraged through other mechanisms. Second, our approach did not take into account other 
receiver characteristics that marketers might look for and that might help drive other macro-level 
diffusion outcomes of interest to marketers. For example, the extent to which a person is an 
“influential” or “opinion leader” might be important, although some studies suggest otherwise 
(Iyengar et al. 2011; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001; Watts and Dodds 2007). Future research 
could consider interpersonal influence as another relevant receiver characteristic. Third, we 
relied on participants’ perceptions of receiver connectivity instead of sociometric connectivity. 
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As discussed earlier (in Study 1), people often rely on perceptions of how connected friends are 
since they do not have better information. Even though “objective” indicators of social 
connectivity exist for people in online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, how many 
friends or followers one has is not a perfect measure of one’s social connectivity since these 
measures are biased upwards (e.g., due to fake accounts). 
In conclusion, four studies (two field experiments, a scenario-based experiment, and a 
simulation) demonstrated the efficacy of using positive externality-based mechanisms for 
encouraging or “nudging” regular consumers’ WOM transmissions such that they were more 
likely to prefer, and therefore select, higher-connectivity friends as receivers. We considered this 
across a variety of settings, for network and non-network goods, and linked the micro-level 
receiver selection behavior to macro-level faster diffusion. Our findings extend the WOM 
marketing literature by introducing an approach for encouraging transmissions to specific types 
of consumers to accelerate diffusion that is a viable alternative to directly targeting higher-
connectivity consumers as seeds in WOM campaigns. Hopefully future research will build on 
our approach in order to make further progress in this important area.   
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mean Receiver Connectivity by Condition (Study 1) 
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Figure 3 
Diffusion Speeds For Different Weights on Receiver Connectivity (Study 4) 
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Web Appendix A: Preliminary Surveys/Assumption Tests 
 
Do Transmitters Consider Receiver Connectivity? 
We assume that an incentive or, more generally, some kind of coordination mechanism, is 
needed for getting customers to transmit WOM to higher-connectivity friends because they usually do 
not think about receiver (friend) connectivity when deciding with whom they will share information. 
This assumption is confirmed in the first survey; i.e., we show that receiver connectivity is not 
typically considered when people transmit WOM. Four hundred and forty-eight members of a large 
U.S. online panel were surveyed. Participants were asked to think of themselves in a situation where 
they were transmitting information about a product/service to someone they knew (e.g., friend, co-
worker, relative) and, for this situation, to write down the most important receiver characteristic that 
came to mind.
17
 We categorized the important receiver characteristics that participants provided into 
categorized into three categories: (i) listening (e.g., “I want a receiver who will listen to me”), (ii) 
connectivity (e.g., “I want a receiver who is well connected”), and (iii) other. Consistent with our 
assumption, only 17 out of 448 participants (3.8%) listed a characteristic that was related to either a 
receiver’s connectivity or ability to disseminate information. Conversely, 256 participants (57.1%) 
listed a receiver’s willingness to listen, with 114 participants specifically using the phrase “good 
listener.” The remaining 175 (39.1%) participants fell into several other categories, including wanting 
the receiver to be intelligent, interesting, or a close friend. These results suggest that transmitters are 
unlikely to place much weight on connectivity when deciding to whom to transmit WOM. 
 
 
Web Appendix B: Stimuli/Manipulations Used in Experiments 
 
B1. Study 1 
 
Thank you for completing the previous task and survey. Before you continue to the next part of today's 
lab session we'd like to tell you about a new marketing research lab that we plan to open in late 2013 
and get your help with something. This will only take a few minutes. 
 
At present, the only way for you to participate in research studies like those you are doing today is on 
select Fridays during the Fall and Spring semesters. As you know, you receive course credit for this. 
We will be opening a new lab facility on campus that will run during the week. You will be able to 
sign up for studies online and you will be PAID for your participation. The facility will be located on 
campus. 
 
If you are interested in being informed over email about this new paid lab sessions opportunity please 
enter your email address in the box below. Your email address will only be used to inform you about 
this lab and will not be shared with anyone other than the lab management team. 
 
[Control Condition] 
 
Finally, note that once this new lab gets started we will need to spread the word about it. Once this 
starts up later in the year we need it to get off the ground quickly, and that means having plenty of 
students aware of it and willing to sign up for paid lab sessions. We will rely heavily on word of mouth 
to get the news out to the university community. 
                                                 
17
 Participants also rated situation familiarity (1 = extremely unfamiliar to 7 = extremely familiar; M = 5.66, SD = 1.12). 
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At this stage we are asking for a little help from you. Please suggest the name of just ONE STUDENT 
(not you!) who you think would like to hear about this and could help spread the word. Enter their 
name in the box below. We will look up their university email address and put them on our contact list. 
 
[Positive Interdependence Condition] 
 
Finally, note that once this new lab gets started we will need to spread the word about it. If not enough 
students around the university sign up for sessions those sessions will be cancelled. That will mean that 
students—perhaps you—who do want to participate and earn some extra money won't be able to unless 
we have a “critical mass” of students who are willing to participate. Once this starts up later in the year 
we need it to get off the ground quickly, and that means having plenty of students aware of it and 
willing to sign up for paid lab sessions. We will rely heavily on word of mouth to get the news out to 
the university community. 
 
At this stage we are asking for a little help from you. Please suggest the name of just ONE STUDENT 
(not you!) who you think would like to hear about this and could help spread the word. Enter their 
name in the box below. We will look up their university email address and put them on our contact list.  
 
B2. Study 2 
 
[Control condition, Urgent condition] 
 
Imagine the following scenario: 
 
You received the following promotional email from Amazon.com. Please read the details very 
carefully and make sure the promotion is clear to you. 
 
Amazon.com Flash Sale on Gift Cards 
 
You have been selected to receive a special offer from Amazon.com, but hurry because this is a 
limited-time offer! 
 
Tomorrow, Tuesday, starting at 12:01am (US PT) and ending at 11:59pm (US PT) you can save 50% 
on the purchase of an Amazon gift card with a face value up to $250. This means that, for example, if 
you wanted to buy an Amazon gift card worth $100, during this Flash Sale you would only pay $50. 
This offer is valid for all types of Amazon gift cards (electronic, print-at-home, send-by-mail) 
purchased through Amazon.com/Giftcards using the discount code FLASH50 when you checkout. 
(Limit one per billing address.) 
 
Is there a catch? No! You and anyone else with this code can receive the discount by making a gift 
card purchase using this code during the 24 hour Flash Sale period tomorrow. 
 
[Externality condition, Urgent condition] 
 
Imagine the following scenario: 
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You received the following promotional email from Amazon.com. Please read the details very 
carefully and make sure the promotion is clear to you. 
 
Amazon.com Flash Sale on Gift Cards 
 
You have been selected to receive a special offer from Amazon.com, but hurry because this is a 
limited-time offer! 
 
Tomorrow, Tuesday, starting at 12:01am (US PT) and ending at 11:59pm (US PT) you can save 50% 
on the purchase of an Amazon gift card with a face value up to $250. This means that, for example, if 
you wanted to buy an Amazon gift card worth $100, during this Flash Sale you would only pay $50. 
This offer is valid for all types of Amazon gift cards (electronic, print-at-home, send-by-mail) 
purchased through Amazon.com/Giftcards using the discount code FLASH50 when you checkout. 
(Limit one per billing address.) 
 
Is there a catch? Yes! For you and anyone else with this code to receive the discount, a minimum of 
50,000 people must make a gift card purchase using this code during the 24 hour Flash Sale period 
tomorrow. If this minimum number of purchases is not reached then you will not receive the 
discounted gift card and will not be charged. 
 
[Control condition, Not urgent condition] 
 
Imagine the following scenario: 
 
You received the following promotional email from Amazon.com. Please read the details very 
carefully and make sure the promotion is clear to you. 
 
Amazon.com Flash Sale on Gift Cards 
 
You have been selected to receive a special offer from Amazon.com, but hurry because this is a 
limited-time offer! 
 
Tomorrow, Tuesday, starting at 12:01am (US PT) and ending next Monday at 11:59pm (US PT) you 
can save 50% on the purchase of an Amazon gift card with a face value up to $250. This means that, 
for example, if you wanted to buy an Amazon gift card worth $100, during this Flash Sale you would 
only pay $50. This offer is valid for all types of Amazon gift cards (electronic, print-at-home, send-by-
mail) purchased through Amazon.com/Giftcards using the discount code FLASH50 when you 
checkout. (Limit one per billing address.) 
  
Is there a catch? No! You and anyone else with this code can receive the discount by making a gift 
card purchase using this code during the 7 day Flash Sale period starting tomorrow. 
 
[Externality condition, Not urgent condition] 
 
Imagine the following scenario: 
 
You received the following promotional email from Amazon.com. Please read the details very 
carefully and make sure the promotion is clear to you. 
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Amazon.com Flash Sale on Gift Cards 
 
You have been selected to receive a special offer from Amazon.com, but hurry because this is a 
limited-time offer! 
 
Tomorrow, Tuesday, starting at 12:01am (US PT) and ending next Monday at 11:59pm (US PT) you 
can save 50% on the purchase of an Amazon gift card with a face value up to $250. This means that, 
for example, if you wanted to buy an Amazon gift card worth $100, during this Flash Sale you would 
only pay $50. This offer is valid for all types of Amazon gift cards (electronic, print-at-home, send-by-
mail) purchased through Amazon.com/Giftcards using the discount code FLASH50 when you 
checkout. (Limit one per billing address.) 
 
Is there a catch? Yes! For you and anyone else with this code to receive the discount, a minimum of 
50,000 people must make a gift card purchase using this code during the 7 day Flash Sale period 
starting tomorrow. If this minimum number of purchases is not reached then you will not receive the 
discounted gift card and will not be charged. 
 
B3. Study 3 
 
[Control condition] 
 
This Year Spread The Word About The Flu, Not The Flu 
 
The 2014-2015 flu season is almost upon us here in the United States, and many indicators point to it 
being potentially more severe than recent past flu seasons. Right now, in September, there are 
relatively low levels of flu throughout most of the US. This is expected to change rapidly as 
temperatures drop and winter approaches. 
 
The influenza vaccine (or "flu shot") is now widely available throughout the United States at drug 
stores, health clinics. The CDC's guidelines note that there are different types of flu shots approved for 
people of different ages, but there are flu shots approved for use in people as young as 6 months of age 
and up. Flu shots are also approved for use in pregnant women and people with chronic health 
conditions. It is recommended that everyone 6 months of age and older get the flu shot this year, 
ideally before October. (Please note: before getting a flu shot you should always consult with a health 
care professional, such as a physician, nurse, or pharmacist.) 
 
It is recommended that people get their flu shot as early as possible - before the beginning of October 
is best.  
 
Studies have shown that the earlier more people get their flu shot, the lower the chance of you getting 
the flu. Getting the flu shot before October also has been shown to significantly reduce the chances of 
the flu spreading quickly among the population and becoming a serious pandemic. 
 
This year, the CDC reminds Americans that it is everyone's responsibility to help reduce the spread of 
the flu. You can help by spreading the word about the flu - remind people to get their flu shot now. 
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Economists estimate that the flu costs the U.S. economy upwards of $10 billion each year. If there is a 
flu pandemic, that cost rises to $100 billion. Each year the government spends your tax dollars on 
covering the direct and indirect costs of the flu. 
 
Fortunately, this cost can be drastically reduced if more people get their annual flu shot early in the 
season, ideally before the beginning of October. So, this year get your flu shot now and help us spread 
the word to others.  
  
The more people who get their flu shot before October, the better off YOU will be. This year spread 
the word about the flu, not the flu. 
  
Here's how YOU can help today 
 
The U.S. government has a website Flu.gov that is an easy to understand source of information about 
the flu and flu shot options available to people. We would like you to email a link to this site to a 
friend, as a way of doing your part to spread the word about the flu, not the flu. 
 
Take a moment to think about who you want to email, and then click the email icon below. Clicking 
this icon will open a new browser tab or window. Follow the steps on there for emailing a link to 
Flu.gov's flu shot page to your friend. They can read about the benefits of getting a flu shot, and even 
search for places in their zip code that administer flu shots. 
 
Privacy notice: this icon opens up a new browser tab or window in which you have to enter email 
addresses (your friend's and your own). An email identified as coming from you will then be sent to 
your friend. A link to Flu.gov will be in that email. The email addresses you enter will be 100% 
private. They are not stored and will not be known by anyone. Your information is safe. A third-party 
email-based link-sharing service is used for this and the requester of this HIT will NOT know the 
email addresses you enter. 
 
Click this icon to open up the interface for emailing a link to Flu.gov to your friend:  [email icon]  
 
[Externality condition] 
 
This Year Spread The Word About The Flu, Not The Flu 
 
The 2014-2015 flu season is almost upon us here in the United States, and many indicators point to it 
being potentially more severe than recent past flu seasons. Right now, in September, there are 
relatively low levels of flu throughout most of the US. This is expected to change rapidly as 
temperatures drop and winter approaches. 
 
The influenza vaccine (or "flu shot") is now widely available throughout the United States at drug 
stores, health clinics. The CDC's guidelines note that there are different types of flu shots approved for 
people of different ages, but there are flu shots approved for use in people as young as 6 months of age 
and up. Flu shots are also approved for use in pregnant women and people with chronic health 
conditions. It is recommended that everyone 6 months of age and older get the flu shot this year, 
ideally before October. (Please note: before getting a flu shot you should always consult with a health 
care professional, such as a physician, nurse, or pharmacist.) 
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It is recommended that people get their flu shot as early as possible - before the beginning of October 
is best.  
 
Studies have shown that the earlier more people get their flu shot, the lower the chance of you getting 
the flu. Getting the flu shot before October also has been shown to significantly reduce the chances of 
the flu spreading quickly among the population and becoming a serious pandemic. 
 
This year, the CDC reminds Americans that it is everyone's responsibility to help reduce the spread of 
the flu. You can help by spreading the word about the flu - remind people to get their flu shot now. 
 
Economists estimate that the flu costs the U.S. economy upwards of $10 billion each year. If there is a 
flu pandemic, that cost rises to $100 billion. Each year the government spends your tax dollars on 
covering the direct and indirect costs of the flu. 
 
Fortunately, this cost can be drastically reduced if more people get their annual flu shot early in the 
season, ideally before the beginning of October. So, this year get your flu shot now and help us spread 
the word to others.  
  
The more people who get their flu shot before October, the better off YOU will be. This year spread 
the word about the flu, not the flu. 
  
Here's how YOU can help today 
 
The U.S. government has a website Flu.gov that is an easy to understand source of information about 
the flu and flu shot options available to people. We would like you to email a link to this site to a 
friend, as a way of doing your part to spread the word about the flu, not the flu. 
 
Take a moment to think about who you want to email, and then click the email icon below. Clicking 
this icon will open a new browser tab or window. Follow the steps on there for emailing a link to 
Flu.gov's flu shot page to your friend. They can read about the benefits of getting a flu shot, and even 
search for places in their zip code that administer flu shots. 
 
As a way of thanking you for doing your part to spread the word about the flu, not the flu, by sending 
this email to a friend you will have a chance to receive a $2 bonus payment for this HIT. 
 
Here's how it works - the link that will automatically be generated in the email to your friend is unique 
to you. Our software tracks this link and tells us how many people visit Flu.gov because of you sharing 
this link with your friend today. If 50 or more people visit Flu.gov through your unique link by 12 
noon Eastern Time tomorrow [date] we will pay you a $2 bonus. It is that simple. 
 
Privacy notice: this icon opens up a new browser tab or window in which you have to enter email 
addresses (your friend's and your own). An email identified as coming from you will then be sent to 
your friend. A link to Flu.gov will be in that email. The email addresses you enter will be 100% 
private. They are not stored and will not be known by anyone. Your information is safe. A third-party 
email-based link-sharing service is used for this and the requester of this HIT will NOT know the 
email addresses you enter. 
 
Click this icon to open up the interface for emailing a link to Flu.gov to your friend: [email icon] 
